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Reducing resources for verification of quantum computations
Samuele Ferracin,∗ Theodoros Kapourniotis,† and Animesh Datta‡
Department of Physics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom
(Dated: August 23, 2018)
We present two verification protocols where the correctness of a “target” computation is checked
by means of “trap” computations that can be efficiently simulated on a classical computer. Our
protocols rely on a minimal set of noise-free operations (preparation of eight single-qubit states or
measurement of four observables, both on a single plane of the Bloch sphere) and achieve linear
overhead. To the best of our knowledge, our protocols are the least demanding techniques able to
achieve linear overhead. They represent a step towards further reducing the quantum requirements
for verification.
I. INTRODUCTION
Scalable quantum computers are expected to decid-
edly widen our computing paradigm, providing polyno-
mial or even exponential speed-ups in the solution of
certain classes of problems [1]. While the realization of
such devices remains out of reach, the development of
small-sized and imperfect quantum computers appears
to be an achievable goal within the next few years [2, 3].
In principle, these “first-generation” quantum computers
should be capable of outperforming classical computers
in some tasks and consequently provide evidence of the
so-called “supremacy” of quantum computers over classi-
cal ones [4]. However, the faulty functioning of their inner
components represents a major issue. In this scenario, a
fundamental question arises: how can we get confidence
about the correct functioning of a quantum computer, if
the correctness of the outcome cannot be checked easily?
That is to say, is it possible to verify the correctness of
the outcome of a quantum computation?
Eventually, quantum computers may not need to be
verified at all. Advances in error correction and fault-
tolerance might increase their reliability up to a point
where verifying their functioning becomes redundant.
Nevertheless, the above question has a deep value, which
goes far beyond the mere scope of verifying a quantum
computation. It refers to the possibility of using classical
logic to verify that a given quantum phenomenon behaves
as predicted in the high complexity regime. Addressing
this question would provide a deeper understanding of
some aspects of computational complexity theory, such as
the relationship between the classes BQP (informally, the
class of problems that can be solved by a quantum com-
puter in a polynomial time) and interactive proofs [5, 6].
Also, verification techniques will be needed by “delegated
computations”, where private users access a quantum
computer remotely and malevolent third-parties might
try to tamper the computation [7]. For all these reasons,
much effort has been made in the last decade in an area
that can be called “quantum verification” [7–16].
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In the previous works, it has been shown that it is pos-
sible to verify an arbitrary quantum computation in sce-
narios where some limited assumptions are made. Based
on the assumptions they rely on, the existing protocols
can be divided into two broad classes. The first is the
class of protocols where a given operation performed dur-
ing the computation (such as state preparation [10, 17–
19] or measurement [12, 20, 21]) is “trusted”, and conse-
quently treated as an ideal and noise-free resource. On
the other hand, the protocols in the second class consider
computations run on two “untrusted” entangled servers
that cannot communicate with each other [11, 13, 14, 22–
24]. The possibility of verifying a quantum computation
without any kind of assumption remains open.
In what follows, we will mainly be concerned with the
first class of verification protocols. In those works, the
problem of verification is illustrated in terms of an in-
teractive game between Alice (the “verifier”) and Bob
(the “prover”) of the following kind. Alice, endowed with
some restricted quantum power, wants to run a univer-
sal quantum computation on Bob’s quantum computer.
However, Alice has no guarantee that Bob will follow her
instructions. Thus, she wants to run the computation in
such a way that if Bob is dishonest, she expects to be
aware of it.
Although games of this kind are interesting for study-
ing the security of delegated computations, some of their
main concerns (such as blindness, namely Alice’s abil-
ity to encrypt her own instructions) might appear more
germane to cryptography than to verification, given that
it seems fairly unlikely that quantum computers will ac-
tively conspire against us. Nevertheless, the reason why
the cryptographic approach is adopted is two-fold. On
the one hand, we do not know how to solve the problem
of verification in a different way: so far, it has not been
possible to find alternative approaches that are also scal-
able and unconditionally secure - as an example, a verifi-
cation technique based on the statistics of the outcomes
is presented in Ref. [25]; however, its validity relies on as-
sumptions on the noise affecting the experimental setup
[26]. On the other hand, the cryptographic approach is
perfectly consistent with the spirit of verification. To
some extent, Bob represents all that can go wrong along
a computation: his attempts to harm the computation
correspond to all of the possible sources of errors able to
2corrupt the computation itself.
As mentioned above, verifying quantum computations
with cryptographic techniques requires that the verifier
has access to a number of ideal resources. Our work
represents a step forward towards minimising the re-
sources required by the existing verification protocols.
This advance is clearly valuable from both the exper-
imental and the theoretical perspective: devising least
demanding protocols makes verification easier to imple-
ment experimentally and, at the same time, helps making
progresses towards understanding what is the smallest set
of noise-free operations needed by the verifier to decide
with confidence on the correctness of an arbitrary quan-
tum computation.
In what follows, we present the following results:
(i) In Section IV we present Protocol 1, a verifica-
tion protocol where the correctness of a quantum
computation is tested by checking the outcome of
several other classically efficiently simulable com-
putations. We prove its effectiveness, modulo a
trust assumption regarding the preparation of sin-
gle qubits in the states {|+〉θ = (|0〉+ eiθ |1〉)/
√
2},
θ ∈ {0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}.
(ii) In Section V, we show that the above protocol
can be adapted to a scenario where the trust as-
sumption is made on the measurement in the set
of bases {|±〉φ〈±|} = {RZ(φ)|±〉〈±|R†Z(φ)}, φ ∈
{0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4} (or equivalently, on the measure-
ment of the observables X , Y , (X ± Y )/√2), pro-
vided that the qubits can be reused after the mea-
surement. Based on this, we present Protocol 2.
In the language of cryptographic protocols:
(i) Supposing that Alice can prepare single qubits in
the set of states {|+〉θ}, θ ∈ {0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}, we
show how she can verify Bob’s behaviour by hiding
her “target” computation among a given number
of “trap” computations, whose outcomes are easy
to compute on a classical computer and can thus
be compared to the obtained ones.
(ii) We show how the above mentioned protocol can
be adapted to the case of Alice making local
measurement in the set of bases {|±〉φ〈±|}, φ ∈
{0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4} (or equivalently, of Alice measur-
ing the observablesX , Y , (X±Y )/√2) and resend-
ing already measured qubits to Bob.
Compared to prior works, our protocols rely on a set of
resources which is minimal and that is restricted to oper-
ations contained on a single plane of the Bloch sphere. In
more detail, Protocol 1 requires noise-free preparation of
eight types of single-qubit states (as opposed to [10, 17–
19], which requires perfect preparation of ten types of
states), while Protocol 2 requires noise-free measurement
of four observables (as opposed to [12], which requires
trusted measurements of five observables). On the other
y
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Figure 1: Example of BwS (see [7] for more details). The
circles represent qubits, the edges represent cZ gates and
the green boxes represent the 10-qubit bricks. In the rest
of the paper, we will label physical qubits with indices i and
j. We divide the BwS into “tapes” (four-column layers be-
tween dashed lines) and label them with index y = 1, .., w.
Any n×m BwS is composed by w = (m− 1)/4 tapes.
hand, the overhead of our protocols (i.e. the number
of operations required) is linear, as well as the overhead
of the most efficient existing protocols [17–19]. As far
as we know, our protocols are the only ones achieving
linear overhead while employing such a minimal set of
resources.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II
we introduce measurement-based quantum computing
(MBQC) and formally define cryptographic protocols. In
Section III we provide a detailed comparison between our
protocols and the existing ones. In Section IV we illus-
trate our verification protocol and prove its validity when
state preparation is ideal. In Section V we show how to
adapt our verification protocol to the case of trusted mea-
surements.
We use the following notation. We denote XY -plane
rotations (respectively ZY -plane rotations) by angle φ
as RZ(φ) = diag(1, e
iφ), and refer to them as “RZ-gate”
(respectively as RX(φ) = HRZ(φ)H , and refer to them
as “RX-gate”). We denote the controlled-Z gate as cZ
and the controlled-X gate as CNOT.
II. BACKGROUND: MBQC AND
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS
In this section, we provide an introduction to MBQC
and cryptographic games.
A. Measurement-based quantum computing
MBQC is a model for universal quantum computation
equivalent to the circuit model [27]. In MBQC, the com-
putation is implemented throughout adaptive measure-
ments of qubits belonging to a large entangled resource
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Figure 2: Representation of a computation on an n×m BwS
(Figure 1) in the circuit model. First, the BwS is generated
by applying a global entangling operation to nm qubits in
the state |+〉. Next, each qubit is rotated and subsequently
measured in the Pauli-X basis (this is equivalent to a mea-
surement in one of the rotated bases {|±〉φ〈±|}). Since the
measurements are performed adaptively, the rotations are rep-
resented as controlled operations [10].
state. The qubits are initialized in the state |+〉 and
entangled to their nearest-neighbors via a cZ operation.
When a qubit is measured, the rest of the resource state
is modified in a way that can equivalently be described
by a series of gates in the circuit model.
An important resource state is the 10-qubit “brick”,
which can be used to generate the so-called “brickwork
state” (BwS; see Figure 1). The BwS is universal for
quantum computation, provided that the measurements -
which are performed column-by-column from left to right
in one of the bases {|±〉φ〈±|} = {RZ(φ)|±〉〈±|R†Z (φ)},
φ ∈ {0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4} - are performed adaptively [7]. By
“adaptive measurement”, we mean that after the mea-
surement of qubit (i, j), the angles φi′,j′ of yet-to-be-
measured qubits are recomputed as (−1)sXφi′,j′ + sZpi,
where sX and sZ are computed on the basis of measure-
ment outcomes of previous qubits (see [28] for further
details). This can be seen as a “correction”, in the sense
that the dependency of the computation on the measure-
ment outcomes vanishes. Thus, adaptive measurements
allow to implement computations in a deterministic way,
regardless of the non-deterministic nature of quantum
measurements.
In the rest of the paper, the computations on a n×m
BwS will often be described through their corresponding
logical circuit (Figure 2). In the circuit model representa-
tion, a measurement in the basis {|±〉φ〈±|} is expressed
as the rotation R†Z(φ) followed by a measurement in the
Pauli-X basis {|±〉〈±|}. Since the angles are recomputed
after every measurement, the rotations are expressed as
controlled-RZ gates.
To simplify the circuit in Figure 2, we notice that
the measurement of each physical qubit (i, j) (with j =
1, ..,m− 1) breaks the entanglement between qubit (i, j)
and the rest of the BwS. At the same time, the state
of qubit (i, j) is teleported to qubit (i, j + 1) modulo
the unitary HR†Z(φi,j) (the measurements are performed
adaptively, hence the dependence of the unitary on the
measurement outcomes can be omitted). Since every
measured qubit is discarded, the outcome of the com-
putation can equivalently be obtained by means of the
logical circuit in Figure 3.
Notice that the circuits represented in Figures 2 and 3
describe the same computation at two different levels. To
highlight this, we will often distinguish between “phys-
ical” qubits (the qubits belonging to the BwS and pro-
cessed along the circuit in Figure 2) and “logical” qubits
(the qubits processed along the circuit in Figure 3).
B. Cryptographic protocols
We now introduce some definitions for cryptographic
protocols. We define quantum states as belonging to the
Hilbert space HABC = HA ⊗HB ⊗HC , where A and B
label Alice and Bob’s private registers and C a common
register used to move qubits from A to B and vice-versa.
We denote the trace distance between the states ρ and
ρ′ as D(ρ, ρ′) = 12Tr|ρ − ρ′|. The symbol ◦ represents
the “normal ordered product” of maps - as an example,
considering the collection of q maps {E (p)}qp=1 acting on
a state ρ, we have ◦qp=1E (p)(ρ) = E (q)E (q−1).. E (1)(ρ).
We start by defining our notion of a protocol.
Definition 1. [Protocol] We define a q-step protocol
on input ρin ∈ HABC as a series of maps {E (p)ABC}qp=1 =
{E (p)AC ⊗ E (p)BC}qp=1 acting on both Alice’s and Bob’s regis-
ters and on the common register, and such that the output
is of the form ρout = ◦qp=1E (p)ABC(ρin).
A protocol is thus a sequence of instructions that de-
fine the actions that Alice and Bob need to take along
the computation. A crucial requirement for any protocol
is that whenever Bob follows Alice’s instruction, the out-
come obtained in Alice’s register is correct. A protocol
with this property is said to be “correct”. We formally
define correctness as follows:
Definition 2. [Correctness] Suppose that Alice wants
to apply a CPTP-map FA to an input ρin ∈ HABC . A
q-step protocol {E (p)ABC}qp=1 = {E (p)AC ⊗ E (p)BC}qp=1 on input
ρin is correct if
D
(
TrBC
[FA(ρin)],TrBC[ρout]
)
= 0 , (1)
where ρout = ◦qp=1
(E (p)AC ⊗ E (p)BC)(ρin).
In cryptographic protocols, a natural requirement is
that no information is leaked to Bob, so that privacy is
guaranteed to Alice. Nevertheless, it must be noticed
that Bob is not forced to follow Alice’s instructions. In
fact, he might deviate from them and try to fool Alice
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Figure 3: Logical circuit associated to a computation on
a six-row BwS. Red dashed lines separate operations imple-
mented within different tapes of the BwS.
(in this case, we say that Bob is “dishonest”). Thus, pro-
tocols must ensure that Bob can not increase his knowl-
edge by cheating, where by cheating we mean that along
the protocol run Bob applies some dishonest collection
of maps {E˜ (p)BC}qp=1 instead of the “honest” collection
{E (p)BC}qp=1. This property is called “blindness” and is
defined as follows:
Definition 3. [Blindness] Suppose that Alice and
Bob jointly run a q-step protocol {E (p)ABC}qp=1 = {E (p)AC ⊗
E (p)BC}qp=1 on input ρin ∈ HABC . The protocol is blind
if, for any set of maps {E˜ (p)BC}qp=1 acting on Bob’s
register B and on the common register C, the state
TrAC[◦qp=1{E (p)AC ⊗ E˜ (p)BC}(ρin)] leaks at most a constant
function of the input.
A typical example of constant function of the input
leaked by a protocol is the size of the computation (the
number of qubits and gates used). This does not depend
on the information that Alice is interested to hide (the
state of the input and of the output and the gates used)
and can be leaked. Thus, at the end of a dishonest run of
a blind protocol, Bob obtains as much information about
the computation as after an honest run.
Another important property for a protocol is verifi-
ability, namely the possibility of verifying whether the
output of the computation is correct or wrong. In our
Protocols, Alice verifies the computation by checking the
outcome of various deterministic quantum computations
(the “traps”). If at the end of the computation the traps
are found in a specific state (here denoted by |acc〉), then
Alice accepts, otherwise she rejects. With this in mind,
denoting the input state ρin as a tensor product between
the input state ρcompin of the actual computation and the
input state |trap〉 of the traps, we define verifiability as
follows [16, 29]:
Definition 4. [Verifiability] Suppose that Alice and
Bob jointly run a q-step protocol {E (p)ABC}qp=1 = {E (p)AC ⊗
E (p)BC}qp=1 on input ρin = ρcompin ⊗ |trap〉〈trap| ∈ HABC .
The protocol is “δ-complete” if
D
(
TrBC
[
ρout
]
, TrBC
[
ρcompout ⊗ |acc〉〈acc|
]) ≤ 1− δ ,
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, ρout = ◦qp=1E (p)ABC(ρin), ρcompout =
Trtrap(ρout) is the honest outcome of the actual compu-
tation and |acc〉〈acc| = Trcomp(ρout) is a fixed state. If
δ = 1, then we say that the protocol is “complete”.
The protocol is “ε-sound” if, for any set of maps
{E˜ (p)BC}qp=1 acting on Bob’s register B and on the com-
mon register C, the output ρ˜out = ◦p
(E (p)AC ⊗ E˜ (p)BC)(ρin)
is such that
D
(
TrBC
[
ρ˜out
]
, TrBC
[
r ρcompout ⊗ |acc〉〈acc| +
(1− r) ρ˜ compout ⊗ |rej〉〈rej|
]) ≤ ε ,
where 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 is called “soundness”, 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, ρ˜ compout
is an arbitrary state and |rej〉 is orthogonal to |acc〉. If the
protocol is both ε-sound and δ-complete, then we say that
it is “(ε, δ)-verifiable”. If a protocol is (ε, δ)-verifiable
with δ = 1, we say that the protocol is “ε-verifiable”.
Thus, a protocol is verifiable if with high probability,
independently of Bob’s behaviour, either the computa-
tion is correct and Alice accepts or the computation is
rejected. As we will see, both Protocol 1 and 2 are com-
plete with δ = 1.
III. RELATED WORKS
Here, we provide a comparison between our schemes
and the existing protocols. We refer the reader to [16]
for a recent detailed review of quantum verification.
Protocol 1 (Section IV) belongs to the class of
“prepare-and-send” protocols, such as [10, 17–19]. In
these schemes, Alice prepares single qubits from a finite
set of states and sends them to Bob, who blindly per-
forms the rest of the computation. Compared to our
5protocol, the other schemes in this class are more expen-
sive in terms of resources while achieving (in the best
case) the same overhead. As an example, in Fitzsimons
and Kashefi’s protocol [10] Alice needs to prepare single
qubits in the state |+〉θ, θ ∈ {0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}, as well
as in the “dummy” states |0〉 and |1〉. The overhead of
Fitzsimons and Kashefi’s protocol is quadratic in the size
of the computation, although it was subsequently made
linear [18, 19]. Compared to our Protocol 1, Fitzsimons
and Kashefi’s protocol requires trusted state preparation
of more types of states (ten instead of eight) while achiev-
ing the same overhead. Similarly, in Broadbent’s proto-
col [17], Alice needs to be able to generate qubits in the
states |0〉 and |+〉 and tp apply the gates X,Z, S and T .
Overall, Broadbent’s protocol requires the same amount
of resources as the Fitzsimons and Kashefi’s one and its
overhead is linear in the input. Other protocols in the
“prepare-and-send” class are that by Aharonov et al. [6].
In terms of resources, Aharonov’s schemes are more de-
manding. Alice holds a multi-qubit register and in one of
these protocols, she needs to apply gates from the Clif-
ford group and subsequently make measurements, while
in the other one she need to apply to her quantum in-
puts a sophisticated encoding inspired to a polynomial
Calderbank-Shor-Steane quantum error correcting codes
[30].
Protocol 2 (Section V) belongs to the class of “receive-
and-measure” protocols, such as the “measurement-only”
scheme [12] and the “post-hoc” verification techniques
[20, 21]. In the measurement-only protocol, Alice needs
to measure the observables X , Y , Z, (X±Y )/√2. Com-
pared to our Protocol 2, this protocol requires noise-free
measurement of more observables (five instead of four).
Also, its soundness ε is O(v + 1), while the soundness
of the protocol presented in [12] goes as 1/
√
v + 1. How-
ever, it has to be mentioned that in Ref. [12], the physical
qubits are discarded after being measured, while Proto-
col 2 relies on the assumption that qubits can be reused
after the measurement has been done. We leave as an
open question the possibility of adapting Protocol 2 to
the more general scenario where the qubits can not be
reused after being measured.
Differently from the protocols mentioned so far, the
post-hoc protocols are schemes with a single round of
communication between the verifier and the prover where
verification is performed after the computation has been
carried out. In these protocols, Alice is solely required to
make measurements in the Pauli-Z and Pauli-X bases.
However, post-hoc protocols are not blind[16]. Also, their
overhead is quadratic in the input.
Finally, a third class of protocols is the class of
“entanglement-based” schemes. In these works, the com-
putation is carried out on two entangled and spatially-
separated servers (the provers). The verifier is “classi-
cal”, in the sense that does not require any resource.
Both provers are untrusted, but their spatial separa-
tion prevents the provers from communicating with each
other and agreeing on a specific cheating strategy af-
ter the protocol is started. The computation is verified
by means of CHSH games [11, 13, 22], self-testing tech-
niques [14, 23] or post-hoc protocols [24]. The overhead
of entanglement-based protocols is higher than that of
the above mentioned schemes [16], although the commu-
nication is only classical. Notice the different perspective
of the previous classes of protocols and the entanglement-
based one: in the first case, the verifier is convinced that
she can trust some quantum device, namely a state gener-
ator or a measurement device; in the second case, instead,
the verifier does not trust any device, but presumes that
the provers do not communicate.
IV. VERIFICATION FOR TRUSTED STATE
PREPARATION
In this section, we present a protocol to verify the
correctness of the outcome of a universal computation
(the “target”) run on a n ×m BwS, modulo a trust as-
sumption on the preparation of qubits in the set of states
|+〉θ = (|0〉+ eiθ |1〉)/
√
2, θ ∈ {0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}. We first
describe the main ideas behind the Protocol (Subsection
IVA) and analyse its overhead (Subsection IVB). Fi-
nally, we show that the protocol is correct, blind and
verifiable (Subsection IVC).
A. Description of the Protocol
In our protocol, the correctness of the target com-
putation is verified by checking the outcome of several
other computations that can be efficiently simulated clas-
sically, the “traps”. The trap computations are chosen
so that their outcome is deterministic and can thus be
used as witnesses: if all of their outcomes correspond to
the expected ones, one assumes that they have not been
affected by errors, and concludes that the target compu-
tation itself has been carried out correctly. Otherwise,
there is no guarantee that the target computation is cor-
rect, hence it has to be rejected.
The specific computation implemented within each
trap is chosen at random from two classes, respectively
denoted as “R-traps” (or “rotation traps”) and “C-traps”
(or “CNOT traps”). The physical qubits of the BwS im-
plementing R-traps are assigned measurement angles as
described in Sub-protocol 1.1. In particular, for any tape
y ∈ (1, .., w) (where by “tape” we mean vertical layers of
the BwS composed of four columns of qubits, see Figure
1) and for any row i ∈ (1, .., n), a coin is flipped. As
illustrated in Figure 4, if the coin outputs 0 (respectively
1), the physical qubits belonging to row i and tape y are
measured so that the logical qubit corresponding to the
ith row undergoes a Hadamard (respectively a rotation).
Logical rotations are performed either on the XY -plane
or on the ZY -plane of the Bloch sphere. Sub-protocol
1.1 combines Hadamards and rotations so that any logi-
6Sub-protocol 1.1 R-trap.
Input: The size of the computation: n×m.
0. Preliminary operations.
Define the n×m {φi,j}, where φi,j = 0 ∀ i, j.
1. Assigning measurement angles.
For every row i = 1, .., n, set counter count = 0. Next,
1.1 For each tape y = 1, .., w − 1:
flip a coin and obtain outcome cy = {0, 1}.
– If cy = 0, set count = count ⊕ 1 and
φi,4y−3=pi/2 , φi,4y−2=pi/2 , φi,4y−1=pi/2
– If cy = 1 and count = 0, set
φi,4y−3=ki,4y−3pi/4 , φi,4y−1=ki,4y−1pi/4
where any ki,j is chosen at random in {0, 1, .., 7}.
Next, set
φi,m = mod(φi,m + φi,4y−3 + φi,4y−1, 2pi)
– If cy = 1 and count = 1, set
φi,4y−2=ki,4y−2pi/4
where any ki,j is chosen at random in {0, 1, .., 7}.
Next, set
φi,m = mod(φi,m + φi,4y−2, 2pi)
1.2 For vertical tape y = w:
– if count = 0, set
φi,4y−3=ki,4y−3pi/4 , φi,4y−1=ki,4y−1pi/4
where any ki,j is chosen at random in {0, 1, .., 7}.
Next, set
φi,m = mod(φi,m + φi,4y−3,+φi,4y−1, 2pi)
– if count = 1, set
φi,4y−3=pi/2 , φi,4y−2=pi/2 , φi,4y−1=pi/2
Output: The set of measurement angles {φi,j}.
Coin outputs 0
Coin outputs 1
H
RZ
or
RX
π
2
π
2
π
2 0
φi,4y−3 0 φi,4y−1 0
0 φi,4y−2 0 0
Figure 4: Sub-protocol 1.1. For any tape y and for any row
i, a coin is flipped. If it outputs 0 - respectively 1 -, qubits
(i, 4y − 3), (i, 4y − 2) (i, 4y − 1) and (i, 4y) are measured so
that logical qubit i undergoes a Hadamard (circuit on the
top) - respectively a rotation (circuits on the bottom; angles
φi,j ∈ {0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4} are chosen at random). Hadamards
and rotations are combined so that overall, qubit i undergoes
a RZ-gate by random angle from the set {0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}.
Sub-protocol 1.2 C-trap.
Input: Size of the computation: n×m.
0. Preliminary operations.
Define the n×m {φi,j}, where φi,j = 0 ∀ i, j.
1. Assigning measurement angles.
For each row i = 1, .., n:
1.1 Flip a coin and obtain ci ∈ {0, 1}. If ci = 0, set φi,1 =
pi/2, otherwise do nothing.
1.2 For each tape y = 1, .., w:
If mod(i+ y, 2) = 0, flip a coin and obtain ci,y ∈ {0, 1}.
Then,
− If ci,y = 0, set
φ2i−1,4y−1=pi/2 , φ2i,4y−2=pi/2 , φ2i,4y=−pi/2
and φi,m = mod(φi,m + φi+1,m, 2pi).
− If ci,y = 1, set
φ2i+1,4y−1=pi/2 , φ2i−1,4y−2=pi/2 , φ2i−1,4y=−pi/2
and φi+1,m = mod(φi+1,m + φi,m, 2pi).
Output: The set of measurement angles {φi,j}.
Coin outputs 0
Coin outputs 1
0 0
π
2 0
0
π
2 0 -
π
2
0
π
2 0 -
π
2
0 0
π
2 0
Figure 5: Sub-protocol 1.2. For any 10-qubit brick involving
rows i and i+1, a coin is flipped. If it outputs 0 (respectively
1), physical qubits composing the brick are measured so that
logical qubits i and i+ 1 undergo a CNOT, qubit i being the
control and qubit i+ 1 being the target (respectively qubit i
being the target and qubit i+ 1 being the control).
cal qubit i is subject to an overall XY -plane rotation
RZ(Φi), where Φi is a random angle belonging to the set
{0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}. (In the rest of the paper, the angles
are labelled with the upper-case letter Φ if they refer to
operations at the logical level, and with the lower-case
letters φ and θ if they refer to operations at the physical
level). The angles Φi can be easily computed classically
(we show this later when we provide the proof of Theorem
1) and are assigned to qubits in the last column of the
BwS.
The C-traps are assigned measurement angles by Sub-
protocol 1.2 in such a way that any 10-qubit brick in
the logical circuit is used to implement a CNOT (Figure
75). For any CNOT, the target and control qubits are
chosen at random between the two logical qubits that
correspond to this brick. Also, a randomly chosen sub-
set of the first-column physical qubits are assigned angle
pi. This corresponds to a Pauli-Z gate acting on the cor-
responding logical qubits at the beginning of the logical
circuit.
The traps are “sensitive” to Bob’s deviations: if Bob
does not follow Alice’s instructions, it is likely that some
traps will output an outcome that does not match with
the expected one. To show this, we now give a more for-
mal description of our protocol in the language of cryp-
tographic protocols.
Protocol 1 defines the roles of Alice and Bob in the
interactive game, under the assumption that Alice can
prepare qubits in the discrete set of states |+〉θ, θ ∈
{0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}. We assume that Alice wants to perform
some quantum computation on a n×m BwS defined by
the set of measurement angles {φi,j}. As a first step, Al-
ice decides the number v of traps that she wants to use.
She also decides at random which graph vt ∈ (1, .., v+1)
will be used to implement the target computation. For
any other graph k 6= vt, she randomly chooses whether it
will be used to implement a R-trap or a C-trap and subse-
quently runs the corresponding Sub-protocol to obtain a
valid set of measurement angles {φ(k)i,j } for the BwS. Also,
Alice defines two sets of variables {r(k)i,j } and {r′(k)i,j } and
a set of angles {θ(k)i,j } for any computation k = 1, .., v+1,
where any r
(k)
i,j and r
′(k)
i,j is chosen at random in {0, 1} and
any angle θ
(k)
i,j is chosen at random in {0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}.
Next, for any computation k ∈ (1, .., v + 1), Alice and
Bob interact as follows:
State preparation: Alice sends Bob nm qubits in
the state RZ(θ
(k)
i,j + pi
∑(k)
(i′,j′)∼(i,j) r
′(k)
i′,j′ ) |+〉, where
the summation runs over all qubits neighbouring
with qubit (i, j). Bob stores the qubits in his reg-
ister and creates the BwS by entangling them with
cZ gates.
Blind computation: Alice asks Bob to measure
each qubit by angle δ
(k)
i,j = (−1)r
′(k)
i,j φ
(k)
i,j + θ
(k)
i,j +
r
(k)
i,j pi. Bob measures qubit (i, j) and reveals the
outcome s
(k)
i,j to Alice. The measurements are per-
formed adaptively: any angle δ
(k)
i,j is modified on
the basis of measurement outcomes and of the pa-
rameters r
(k)
i,j of previous qubits, so that the overall
computation does not depend on the random vari-
ables.
Verification: If the kth computation is a trap, Al-
ice checks the outcomes of the measurements of the
last-column qubits. If they are all 0, she proceeds
with the computation k + 1, otherwise she rejects
the whole run.
Protocol 1.
Hypothesis:
Alice can prepare single qubits in the state |+〉
θ
(k)
i,j
,
where θ
(k)
i,j ∈ {0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}.
Input:
(i) the number of computations v.
(ii) the set of measurement angles {φi,j} for the target com-
putation.
(iii) the sets of random variables {r
(k)
i,j = 0, 1}, {r
′(k)
i,j = 0, 1}
and the set of random angles {θ
(k)
i,j = 0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4} for
any computation k = 1, .., v + 1.
0. Preliminary operation.
Alice randomly chooses vt ∈ (1, 2, . . . , v + 1) and sets
{φ
(vt)
i,j } = {φi,j}.
For k = 1, .., v + 1:
1. Assigning measurement angles.
If k 6= vt, Alice randomly runs Sub-protocol 1.1 or Sub-
protocol 1.2 on input n×m and obtains the set {φ
(k)
i,j }.
2. State preparation. For i = 1, .., n and for
j = 1, ..,m, Alice sends to Bob a qubit in the state
RZ(θ
(k)
i,j + pi
∑(k)
(i′,j′)∼(i,j) r
′(k)
i′,j′
) |+〉, where the summa-
tion runs over all qubits (i′, j′) that are nearest neigh-
bours of qubit (i, j) in the kth computation.
3. Blind Computation.
3.1 Bob entangles the qubits in his register and cre-
ates the BwS.
3.2 For j = 1, .., m and for i = 1, .., n,
- Alice computes the angle δ
(k)
i,j =
(−1)r
′(k)
i,j φ
(k)
i,j + θ
(k)
i,j + r
(k)
i,j pi and reveals
it to Bob.
- Bob measures qubit (i, j) in the basis
|±〉
δ
(k)
i,j
〈±| and reveals the outcome s
(k)
i,j to
Alice.
- Alice recomputes the measurement outcome
s
(k)
i,j as s
(k)
i,j ⊕r
(k)
i,j . Next, she recomputes mea-
surement angles of yet-to-be-measured qubits
as {(−1)sXφ
(k)
i,j + sZpi}.
4. Verification.
If k 6= vt and {s
(k)
i,m}
n
i=1 6= (0, 0, .., 0), Alice rejects the
whole computation.
Output: Outcomes {s
(vt)
i,m } of measurements of last-column
qubits of the target computation.
8B. Overheads
The amount of classical bits and qubits sent by Alice
to Bob is NAbit = 3(v + 1)nm and N
A
qubit = (v + 1)nm
respectively. Notice that the qubits can be sent to Bob
through an “off-line” interaction (i.e. in a single round
and before the input is given), while the exchange of bits
is done via an “on-line” interaction (i.e. through separate
uses of the channel and after the computation is started;
recall that Alice needs to adapt the angles after every
measurement). On the other hand, the number of qubits
sent by Bob to Alice is NBqubit = 0, while the amount of
bits is equal to NBbit = (v+1)nm. Bob sends to Alice the
classical bits of information through an on-line interac-
tion. Therefore we conclude that the overhead is linear
on the size of the target computation.
C. Correctness, Blindness and Verifiability
We now show the results regarding Protocol 1.
Theorem 1. [Correctness] Protocol 1 is correct.
Proof. The correctness of Protocol 1 can be proven using
similar arguments as those in [7]. Since cZ commutes
with RZ -rotations, the rotation characterizing any given
physical qubit (i, j) cancels at the same time the rota-
tion by angle θi,j in δi,j and the negative sign in front of
angles φ
(k)
i,j . Second, the effect of the random variables
ri,j is cancelled out by Alice when she recomputes the
measurement outcome s
(k)
i,j as s
(k)
i,j ⊕ r(k)i,j (step 3.2 of Pro-
tocol 1). Thus, any computation k = 1, .., v+1 correctly
reproduces a computation on a BwS initially in the state
|+〉⊗nm and determined by the set of measurement angles
{φ(k)i,j }. We refer to Appendix A for more details.
Theorem 2. [Blindness] Protocol 1 is blind.
Proof. The theorem can be proven with similar argu-
ments as those in [7] (see also [31] for a more formal
proof). We refer to Appendix B for a proof of the theo-
rem.
Theorem 3. [Verifiability] For any v ≥ 7, Protocol 1
is ε-verifiable with soundness
ε =
7
v + 1
(
7
8
)6
∼= 3.14
v + 1
, (2)
where v represents the number of trap computations.
The proof of Theorem 3 relies on the following Lem-
mas:
Lemma 1. Let ρ be a 2N × 2N density matrix and let
P, P ′ be two n-fold tensor products of the set of operators
{1, Z,X, Y }. Denoting with {Qr} the set of all n-fold
|+〉
θ
′(1)
1,1
|+〉
θ
′(1)
2,1
|+〉
θ
′(k)
i,j
|δ
(1)
1,1〉
|δ
(1)
2,1〉
|δ
(k)
i,j 〉
|0〉|B|
R†Z
R†Z
R†Z
UE U
(1)
1,1
U
(1)
2,1
U
(k)
i,j
X
X
X
Figure 6: Circuit diagram of a computation on a BwS. UE
represents Bob’s deviations during the entangling operation,
while each U
(k)
i,j represents Bob’s deviations before the mea-
surement of physical qubit (i, j) along computation k. Bob’s
private register is initialized in the state |0〉|B|. For sim-
plicity, in the above picture we have rewritten each angle
θ
(k)
i,j + pi
∑
(i′,j′)∼(i,j) r
′(k)
i′,j′
as θ
′(k)
i,j .
|+〉
|+〉
|+〉
|δ
(1)
1,1〉
|δ
(1)
2,1〉
|δ
(k)
i,j 〉
R†Z
(
φ
(1)
1,1
)
R†Z
(
φ
(1)
2,1
)
R†Z
(
φ
(k)
i,j
)
X
r′(1)
1,1 Z
r(1)
1,1
X
r′(1)
2,1 Z
r(1)
2,1
X
r′(k)
i,j Z
r(k)
i,j
|0〉|B|
UB
X
X
X
Figure 7: Simplification of circuit in Figure 6 where (i) de-
viations are moved toward the end of the circuit and merged
into UB , (ii) the angles θ
(k)
i,j contained in rotations are can-
celled out with rotations of the state of the physical qubits,
(iii) a summation is made over the angles θ
(k)
i,j and (iv) the
controlled-RZ gates are rewritten as un-controlled unitaries.
tensor products of the set of operators {1, Z,X, Y }, the
following equation holds:
4N∑
r=1
QrPQrρQrP
′Qr = 0 ∀ P 6= P ′ (3)
9Lemma 2. Consider a computation implementing an R-
trap. Suppose that some of the physical qubits composing
the BwS are phase-flipped. Then, for any combination
of phase-flips, apart from two well-defined sets of combi-
nations denoted as “Type-I” and “Type-II”, the average
probability of obtaining the string (0, 0, .., 0) as outcome
of last-column measurements is upper bounded by 3/4,
i.e. phase-flips are detected with probability at least 1/4.
Lemma 3. Consider a computation implementing a C-
trap. Suppose that some of the physical qubits composing
the BwS are phase-flipped. Then, for any combination
of phase-flips belonging to the “Type-I” or “Type-II” sets
or to their “cross product”, the average probability of ob-
taining the string (0, 0, .., 0) as outcome of last-column
measurements is upper bounded by 1/2, i.e. phase-flips
are detected with probability at least 1/2.
We first use the Lemmas to prove Theorem 3 and then
we prove the Lemmas. The sets of Type-I and Type-
II errors are formally introduced along the proofs of the
Lemmas and illustrated in Figure 15.
Proof. (Theorem 3) First, we show that the protocol is
complete with δ = 1. To do this, we show that the Sub-
protocols assign the correct measurement angles:
• Sub-protocol 1.1 For any tape y ∈ (1, .., w) and
row i ∈ (1, .., n), the assignments made in steps
(1.1) and (1.2) of Sub-protocol 1.1 correspond to
Hadamards, RZ -gates and RX -gates (Figure 3).
Thus, the logical unitary implemented within the
computation acts locally on each logical qubit i.
Considering the role of the counter count in steps
(1.1) and (1.2), it can be seen that (i) the gates
implemented on each logical qubit i by measur-
ing physical qubits in the first tape are either
Hadamards or XY -plane rotations, (ii) an odd
number of Hadamards is implemented between
XY -plane and ZY -plane rotations, and (iii) the
gates implemented on each logical qubit i by mea-
suring physical qubits in the last tape are either
Hadamards or XY -plane rotations. As a conse-
quence, the relation HRX(Φ)H = RZ(Φ) valid for
any Φ implies that the overall unitary acting on
each logical qubit i is a rotation on the XY -plane
of the Bloch sphere. Due to the same relation,
the angle of the overall rotation can be (efficiently)
computed as a summation of all of the angles char-
acterizing the rotations implemented in the various
tapes. Thus, the measurements of qubits in the last
column of the BwS are expected to yield 0.
• Sub-protocol 1.2 Considering Figure 3, it can be
seen that (i) the assignments made in step (1.1)
of Sub-protocol 1.2 produce Pauli-Z gates acting
on a random subset of logical qubits and (ii) the
assignments made in step (1.2) produce CNOTs in
the logical circuit, target and control qubits being
chosen at random. To see that the measurements
|+〉
|+〉
|+〉
R†Z(φ
(1)
1,1)
R†Z(φ
(1)
2,1)
R†Z(φ
(j)
i,j )
Zl
(1)
1,1
Zl
(1)
2,1
Zl
(k)
i,j
X
X
X
Figure 8: Simplification of circuit in Figure 7 after Bob’s
private system and the classical registers are traced out. The
parameters l
(k)
i,j = 0, 1 take into account deviations affecting
physical qubits (i, j).
of last-column qubits yield 0, it can be used that
CNOTc,t = (1c ⊗ |+〉t〈+|+Zc⊗ |−〉t〈−|)/2, where
the index “c” labels the control qubit and “t” the
target. This relation also allows to compute angles
φi,m in an efficient way.
Thus, if Bob is honest, the trap computations always
yield the expected outcome and Alice does always accept.
This proves that δ = 1.
To prove that the protocol is ε-sound, consider the
operations on Bob’s side (represented in the circuit dia-
gram in Figure 6). As in [10, 18], we describe Bob’s dis-
honest operations through a collection of unitaries (the
“deviations”) acting on yet-to-be-measured qubits, on
the angles and on Bob’s private system. The deviation
UE represents the dishonest entangling operation, while
U
(k)
i,j represents Bob deviations before the measurement
of qubit (i, j) in the kth graph. Thus, using for simplic-
ity the notation O · σ = OσO† for an operator O and a
state σ, the state of the system immediately before the
measurements is of the form
σout =
∑
θ,r,r′
U
(v+1)
n,m cR
†(v+1)
n,m ..U
(1)
1,1 cR
†(1)
1,1 UEE · (σθ,r,r
′
in )
22nm(v+1)8nm(v+1)
,
where each operator cR
†(k)
i,j represents the rotation acting
on qubit (i, j) of computation k and controlled by angle
δ
(k)
i,j , E represents the global entangling operation and
the summation is made over all of the combinations of
the angles {θ(k)i,j } and of the sets {r(k)i,j } and {r′(k)i,j }. For
any particular choice of θ, r and r′, the state σθ,r,r
′
in is
equal to
σθ,r,r
′
in =
⊗
i,j,k
|+〉
θ
′(k)
i,j
〈+| ⊗ |δ(k)i,j 〉〈δ(k)i,j | ⊗ |0〉|B|〈0| ,
where θ
′(k)
i,j = θ
(k)
i,j + pi
∑(k)
(i′,j′)∼(i,j) r
′(k)
i′,j′ . To proceed, we
rewrite σout as follows. First, we move the deviations
towards the end of the circuit and “merge” them into
a sole unitary UB. Next, as we do along the proof of
correctness (see Appendix A), we rewrite the controlled
RZ-gates as un-controlled rotations and cancel every an-
gle θ
(k)
i,j in the RZ-gates with the XY -plane pre-rotations
characterizing the state of the physical qubits. At this
10
point, summing over all the possible θ
(k)
i,j , the angles δ
(k)
i,j
become the completely mixed state. We thus obtain the
state
σout =
∑
r,r′
UB
[⊗i,j,k Zr(k)i,jXr′(k)i,j R†(φ(k)i,j )Xr′(k)i,j ]E · (σ0,r,r′in )
22nm(v+1)
where
σ0,r,r
′
in =
⊗
i,j,k
Z
∑
(i′,j′)∼(i,j) r
′(k)
i′,j′ |+〉(k)i,j 〈+|Z
∑
(i′,j′)∼(i,j) r
′(k)
i′,j′
⊗ 13nm(v+1) ⊗ |0〉|B|〈0|
and 13nm(v+1) is the identity on the classical registers
containing the information about the angles. Using the
relation (X ⊗ 1)cZ = cZ(X ⊗ Z), we can commute the
Pauli-Xs on the right-hand side of the rotations with E,
and subsequently cancel them out with the Pauli-Zs in
σ0,r,r
′
in . We thus obtain the state in Figure 7.
When both Bob’s private system and the classical reg-
ister are traced out, UB becomes a CPTP-map E = {Eu}.
Rewriting the operational elements {Eu} as a linear com-
bination of tensor products of Pauli operators Pl, the
state of the system just before the measurement can be
rewritten as
ρout =
∑
u,l,l′
r,r′
au,la
∗
u,l′
22nm(v+1)
⊗
i,j,k
P
(k)
l|(i,j)Q
(k)
(i,j)ρin Q
(k)
(i,j)P
(k)
l′|(i,j) ,
where P
(k)
l|(i,j) is the component of Pl acting on qubit (i, j)
of the kth computation, Q
(k)
(i,j) = Z
r
(k)
i,j
i,j X
r
′(k)
i,j
i,j , au,l are
complex numbers and
ρin = E
[⊗
i,j,k
R†Z(φ
(k)
i,j )|+〉
(k)
i,j 〈+|RZ(φ(k)i,j )
]
E
After the measurements in the Pauli-X basis, the above
state becomes
ρ′out =
∑
u,l,l′
r,r′,s
au,la
∗
u,l′
22nm(v+1)
⊗
i,j,k
Zs
(k)
i,j |+〉(k)i,j 〈+|Zs
(k)
i,j ×
× (k)i,j 〈+|Zs
(k)
i,j P
(k)
l|(i,j)Q
(k)
(i,j)ρin Q
(k)
(i,j)P
(k)
l′|(i,j)Z
s
(k)
i,j |+〉(k)i,j
where s = {s(k)i,j } represents a combination of outcomes.
After Alice recomputes s
(k)
i,j as s
(k)
i,j ⊕ r(k)i,j , ρ′out becomes
ρ′out =
∑
u,l,l′
r,r′,s
au,la
∗
u,l′
22nm(v+1)
⊗
i,j,k
Zs
(k)
i,j
⊕r
(k)
i,j |+〉(k)i,j 〈+|Zs
(k)
i,j
⊕r
(k)
i,j
× (k)i,j 〈+|Zs
(k)
i,j P
(k)
l|(i,j)Q
(k)
(i,j)ρin Q
(k)
(i,j)P
(k)
l′|(i,j)Z
s
(k)
i,j |+〉(k)i,j
=
∑
u,l,l′
r,r′,s′
au,la
∗
u,l′
22nm(v+1)
⊗
i,j,k
Zs
′(k)
i,j |+〉(k)i,j 〈+|Zs
′(k)
i,j
× (k)i,j 〈+|Zs
′(k)
i,j
[P (i,j,k)l,l′ (ρin)]Zs′(k)i,j |+〉(k)i,j
where
P (i,j,k)l,l′ (ρin) = Q(k)(i,j)P (k)l|(i,j)Q(k)(i,j)ρin Q(k)(i,j)P (k)l′|(i,j)Q(k)(i,j)
To obtain the second equality, one can (i) make the
change of variable s
(k)
(i,j) → s
′(k)
(i,j) = s
(k)
(i,j) ⊕ r
(k)
(i,j) and (ii)
use the fact that Pauli-X operators stabilize |+〉 states to
add extra X
r
′(k)
i,j
i,j . Summing over all possible {r(k)i,j } and
{r′(k)i,j } and using the Pauli-twirl (Lemma 1), the above
state becomes
ρ′out =
∑
l,s
bl
⊗
i,j,k
Zs
(k)
i,j |+〉(k)i,j 〈+|Zs
(k)
i,j
× (k)i,j 〈+|Zs
(k)
i,j P
(k)
l|(i,j)ρin P
(k)
l|(i,j)Z
s
(k)
i,j |+〉(k)i,j
where bl =
∑
u |au,l|2 and
∑
l bl = 1. Thus, the effects ofE are reduced to that of a convex combination of tensor
products of Pauli operators affecting each qubit locally.
Moreover, since Pauli-X operators stabilize |+〉 states,
the effect of the Pauli-X components of the Pauli oper-
ators Pl on the system is trivial. Thus, the circuit in
Figure 7 can be rewritten as the circuit in Figure 8. This
result is similar to that obtained in [6, 17, 18]crucial, and
is crucial. Indeed, it allows us to use Lemmas 2 and 3:
on average, Bob’s deviations reduce to local phase-flips of
physical qubits, therefore the problem of detecting Bob’s
deviations becomes the problem of detecting all of the
possible combinations of phase-flips affecting the various
graphs. As illustrated in Figures 9 and 10, this produces
by-products of Pauli-X and Pauli-Z affecting the com-
putation at the logical level.
To obtain equation 13, we consider the case where Bob
deviates on v˜ computations. We first compute an upper
bound to the probability p(E1 ∧ E2|v˜) of the events E1
Bob corrupts the target computation and E2 Bob is not
detected happening simultaneously when Bob deviates on
v˜ computations. Next, we maximize over v˜. The proba-
bility p(E1 ∧E2|v˜) is upper-bounded as
p(E1 ∧ E2|v˜) = p(E1|v˜)p(E2|E1, v˜)
≤ v˜
v + 1
(
7
8
)v˜−1
,
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|+〉
|+〉
|+〉
|+〉
|+〉
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Figure 9: Logical circuit associated to a computation on a six-row BwS affected by phase-flips at the physical levels. Red
dashed lines separate operations implemented within different tapes of the BwS. Each row represents a logical qubit. Extra
Pauli operators Xli,j and Zli,j are logical by-products generated by phase-flipping the physical qubit (i, j). We also refer to
by-products as “errors”.
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Figure 10: Simplification of circuit in Figure 9 valid for R-traps. This circuit can be obtained setting to 0 the angles between
cZ-gates, hence moving cZ-gates toward each other and cancelling them out. Before cancelling out, cZ-gates have to be
commuted with extra Pauli-X operators. This generates the red Pauli-Z errors. Logical qubits are now kept disentangled all
along the computation, hence errors affecting a given logical qubit can not spread and affect other logical qubits.
The factor v˜/(v + 1) upper bounds the probability
p(E1, v˜) of event E1 happening, while the term (7/8)
v˜−1
maximizes p(E2|E1, v˜). Indeed, by Lemmas 2 and 3,
p(E2|E1, v˜) is maximized by those combinations of phase-
flips that corrupt R-traps (and are detected with prob-
ability ≥ 3/4) and do not corrupt C-traps. Considering
that in the Protocol, the choice between R-traps and C-
traps is made independently at random, we obtain
p(E2|E1, v˜) ≤
(
1
2
× 3
4
+
1
2
× 1
)v˜−1
=
(
7
8
)v˜−1
,
where the exponent v˜ − 1 is due to the fact that if Bob
affects the target, then he will affect v˜ − 1 trap compu-
tations. Maximizing p(E1 ∧E2|v˜) over v˜ (which is an
integer), we find Bob’s highest probability of corrupting
the target computation without being detected:
ε = max
v˜
[p(E1 ∧ E2|v˜)] = 3.14
v + 1
, for v˜ = 7 (4)
The quantity ε represents the soundness of Protocol
1. Indeed, the condition p(E1 ∧ E2|v˜) ≤ ε implies that
the output is ε-close to the state p ρout ⊗ |acc〉〈acc| +
(1 − p) ρ˜out ⊗ |rej〉〈rej| (with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1), as required by
Definition 4.
We now prove the Lemmas.
Proof. (Lemma 1) We refer to [32] for a proof of the
Lemma.
Proof. (Lemma 2) The main tool that will be used in this
proof is the following fact, which can be verified via an
explicit calculation. Suppose that a qubit in the state
|+〉 is rotated around the Z-axis of the Bloch sphere by a
random and unknown angle Φ⋆ ∈ {0, pi/2, 2pi/2, 3pi/2}. If
the state is subsequently measured in the basis {|±〉〈±|},
the average probability of getting outcome 0 is equal to
1
4
∑
Φ⋆
∣∣ 〈+|RZ(Φ⋆)|+〉 ∣∣2 = 1
2
(5)
To prove the Lemma we proceed as follows:
Step I: We argue that the combinations of phase-
flips that have the least probability of being de-
tected are those that affect at most one logical
qubit. We find the set of combinations affecting an
arbitrary logical qubit i, and subsequently restrict
our analysis to this set of combinations.
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Step II: We consider all of the combinations of
phase-flips of physical qubits belonging to a single
vertical tape y and affecting logical qubit i. We
show that these errors are detected with probability
at least 1/4.
Step III: We consider phase-flips of physical qubits
belonging to two neighbouring tapes y and y + 1
and affecting logical qubit i. Making exception for
Type-I errors, we show that these errors are de-
tected with probability at least 1/4.
Step IV: We consider phase-flips of physical qubits
belonging to two tapes y and y′ and affecting logical
qubit i, as well as to more than two tapes. We show
that the same upper bound as above is obtained,
making exceptions for Type-II errors.
We now elaborate on these steps.
Step I. Consider Figure 9, which represents a logical
computation in the presence of phase-flips affecting the
physical qubits. As it can be seen in Sub-protocol 1.1
(steps 1.1, 1.2), φi,4y = 0 for any row i and tape y. Hence,
with reference to the Figure, the only logical operators
in between the cZ-gates are the Pauli-X errors. Moving
the cZ-gates toward each other and cancelling them out,
Pauli-X errors propagate to the other logical qubits and
by-products of Pauli-Z are produced (Figure 10).
After cancelling the cZ-gates, the logical qubits are
kept disentangled all along the rest of the computation.
Hence, the by-products affecting a given logical qubit can
not spread and affect the rest of the logical qubits, nor
cancel out with each other. In other words, after can-
celling the cZ-gates, logical errors remain “local”. For
this reason, the error with the least probability of be-
ing detected must be such that after the cZ-gates are
cancelled out, only one logical qubit is affected by by-
products (for if more than one is affected, the probabil-
ity of detecting the errors can not be smaller than it is
if only one qubit is affected). This enables us to restrict
our analysis to the combinations of phase-flips affecting
a single logical qubit i.
The combinations of phase-flips affecting logical qubit
i are contained in the set of combinations of phase-flips
of red physical qubits in Figure 11. Eventually, some of
the combinations will also corrupt logical qubits i − 1
and i + 1, but we do not consider (unless explicitly
specified) the effects they have on these qubits.
Step II. We restrict the analysis to phase-flips of qubits
belonging to a single tape y and affecting logical qubit i.
We show that they are detected by R-traps with proba-
bility larger than 1/4.
Let U
(y)
i = RZ(φ3)RX(φ2)RZ(φ1) be the unitary im-
plemented on logical qubit i within tape y in the absence
of phase-flips. In the presence of errors, U
(y)
i becomes
(see Figure 12 for labels)
U˜
(y)
i = X
l4Zl5⊕l3RZ(φ3)X
l2RX(φ2)Z
l1RZ(φ1)
Moving the errors toward the beginning of the circuit, we
obtain
U˜
(y)
i = RZ
(
(−1)l4φ3
)
RX
(
(−1)l3⊕l5φ2
)
RZ
(
(−1)l4⊕l2φ1
)
· X l4⊕l2Z l5⊕l3⊕l1
Thus, when the by-products are moved toward the begin-
ning of the tape, the sign of some angles characterizing
U
(y)
i might be flipped. To understand which combina-
tions of phase-flips have a non-trivial effect on U
(y)
i , we
proceed by direct calculation: we consider all of the pos-
sible combinations and see if U˜
(y)
i = U
(y)
i , keeping in
mind that U
(y)
i will either be an XY -plane rotation, a
ZY -plane rotation or a Hadamard.
The explicit calculations are illustrated in Table 1. As
it can be seen, the only error that never corrupts U
(y)
i
corresponds to l3 = l5 = 1 and the other l equal to 0.
However, l5 = 1 implies a “l4 Pauli-X error” affecting
logical qubit i+1 (or i−1), which has a non-trivial effect
on U
(y)
i+1 (or U˜
(y)
i−1). All of the remaining errors affect
U
(y)
i non-trivially whenever it implements at least two
gates from the set {H,RZ , RX}. This is crucial, hence
we present it with some examples. As can be seen, error
l1 = l2 = 1 and the other l equal to 0 always corrupts
U
(y)
i , both in the case where it implements a rotation or
a Hadamard. On the contrary, error l1 = l3 = 1 and the
other l equal to 0 has a non-trivial effect on U
(y)
i only
if implements a Hadamard or a RX -gate, but does not
affect RZ -gates. No error corrupts U
(y)
i in less than two
cases (apart from the already mentioned l3 = l5 = 1 and
the other l equal to 0).
We can now lower bound the probability of detecting
single-tape phase-flips by 1/4. To compute the bound,
we first notice that for any combination of phase-flips
affecting solely tape y, U˜
(y)
i 6= U (y)i with probability at
least 1/2. This can be seen considering that (i) as pointed
out above, each combination of phase-flips affects non-
trivially at least two logical unitaries out of three, and (ii)
U
(y)
i is a Hadamard with probability 1/2 and a rotation
with probability 1/2. Thus, errors that affect RZ-gates
and RX -gates, but do not affect Hadamards (e.g. l1 =
l4 = 1 and the other l = 0) have the least probability
of corrupting the R-trap, and this probability is equal
to 1/2. Next, we use equation 5 to show that whenever
U˜
(y)
i 6= U (y)i , the error is detected with probability ≥1/2.
To see this, consider the possible ways phase-flips can
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Flipped qubits RZ(φ1 + φ3) RX(φ2) H
1 RZ(φ1 + φ3)Z RX(φ2)Z HZ
2 RZ(−φ1 + φ3)X RX(φ2)X HXZ
3 RZ(φ1 + φ3)Z RX(−φ2)Z HX
4 RZ(−φ1 − φ3)X RX(φ2)X HZ
5 RZ(φ1 + φ3)Z RX(−φ2)Z HX
1,2 RZ(−φ1 + φ3)XZ RX(φ2)XZ HX
1,3 RX(−φ2) HXZ
1,4 RZ(−φ1 − φ3)XZ RX(φ2)XZ
1,5 RX(−φ2) HXZ
2,3 RZ(−φ1 + φ3)XZ RX(−φ2)XZ HZ
2,4 RZ(φ1 − φ3) HX
2,5 RZ(−φ1 + φ3)XZ RX(−φ2)XZ HZ
3,4 RZ(−φ1 − φ3)XZ RX(−φ2)XZ HXZ
3,5
4,5 RZ(−φ1 − φ3)XZ RX(−φ2)XZ HXZ
1,2,3 RZ(−φ1 + φ3)X RX(−φ2)X
1,2,4 RZ(φ1 − φ3)Z RX(φ2)Z HX
1,2,5 RZ(−φ1 + φ3)X RX(−φ2)X
1,3,4 RZ(−φ1 − φ3)X RX(−φ2)X HX
1,3,5 RZ(φ1 + φ3)Z RX(φ2)Z HZ
1,4,5 RZ(−φ1 − φ3)X RX(−φ2)X HX
2,3,4 RZ(φ1 − φ3)Z RX(−φ2)Z
2,3,5 RZ(−φ1 + φ3)X RX(φ2)X HXZ
2,4,5 RZ(φ1 − φ3)Z RX(−φ2)Z
3,4,5 RZ(−φ1 − φ3)X RX(φ2)X HZ
1,2,3,4 RZ(φ1 − φ3) RX(−φ2) HZ
1,2,3,5 RZ(−φ1 + φ3)XZ RX(φ2)XZ HX
1,2,4,5 RZ(φ1 − φ3) RX(−φ2) HZ
1,3,4,5 RZ(−φ1 − φ3)XZ RX(φ2)XZ
2,3,4,5 RZ(φ1 − φ3) HX
1,2,3,4,5 RZ(φ1 − φ3)Z RX(φ2)Z HXZ
Table 1: The effects of phase-flips on a single tape y after the
by-products are moved toward the beginning of the tape (i.e.
“to the right” of the unitary implemented within the tape).
White spaces correspond to the cases where the by-products
have a trivial effect on the unitary implemented within tape y
(i.e. U˜
(y)
i = U
(y)
i ). We refer to Figure 12 for labels regarding
phase-flipped qubits.
i+ 1
i
i− 1
y − 1 y y + 1
Figure 11: Phase-flips affecting the overall unitary acting on
logical qubit i. Phase-flips of red physical qubits generate
by-products of Pauli-Z or Pauli-X that affect logical qubit i
along the computation.
l1 l2 l3 l4
l5
φ1 φ2 φ3 0
Figure 12: Phase-flips affecting the unitary implemented on
logical qubit i within tape y are described by the set of pa-
rameters lq, q = 1, .., 5. lq can either be 0 (no flip) or 1 (flip).
i+ 1
i
i− 1
y − 1 y y + 1
R
X
Figure 13: Tape y is used to implement a RX -gate on log-
ical qubit i. If red qubits are phase-flipped, rotation an-
gle φi,4y−2 associated to green physical qubit is mapped
into −φi,4y−2. Thus, instead of being output in some ex-
pected state RZ(Φi) |+〉, logical qubit i is output in the state
RZ(Φ
⋆
i )RZ(Φi) |+〉, where Φ
⋆
i = −2φi,4y−2 is a random angle
in {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}. By equation 5, the probability of detect-
ing the phase-flips is 1/2.
i+ 1
i
i− 1
y − 3 y − 2 y − 1
R
X H RZ
Pauli-X
Figure 14: Pushing a Pauli-X by-product from tape y toward
the beginning of the circuit flips the sign of angles associated
to green physical qubit. Supposing that angles of green qubits
sum up to Φ˜i ∈ {0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}, and that the overall rotation
angle is equal to Φi ∈ {0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}, logical qubit i is here
output in the state RZ(Φi
⋆)RZ(Φi) |+〉, where Φ
⋆
i = −2Φ˜i is
a random angle. By equation 5, the probability of detecting
the presence of the by-product is 1/2.
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corrupt U
(y)
i (remember that the overall operation on
each logical qubit is an RZ-gate):
(i) The sign of a set of angles {φi,j} is flipped. Us-
ing −φi,j = φi,j − 2φi,j for any i, j, it can be seen
that logical qubit i is subject to the honest over-
all rotation modulo a rotation by a random angle
Φ⋆i = 2
∑
i,j φi,j ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}. Thus, equa-
tion 5 guarantees that Bob’s success rate is equal
to 1/2. An example is provided in Figure 13.
(ii) The angles remain unchanged and a by-product of
Pauli-X is produced. Commuting the Pauli-X er-
ror all the way through to the beginning of the cir-
cuit, the sign of a set of angles {φi,j} is indeed
flipped. Thus, by equation 5, the probability of de-
tecting the presence of the by-product is 1/2. An
example is provided in Figure 14.
(iii) The angles remain unchanged and a by-product of
Pauli-Y is produced. Commuting the Pauli-Y er-
ror all the way through to the beginning of the cir-
cuit, the sign of some set of angles {φi,j} is indeed
flipped. Thus, by equation 5, the probability of
detecting the presence of the by-product is 1/2.
(iv) The angles remain unchanged and a by-product of
Pauli-Z is produced. Since RZ -gates commute with
Pauli-Z, the error can be moved to the beginning
of the circuit. As a consequence, the input qubit is
phase-flipped and the error is detected with prob-
ability 1.
Overall, any combination of phase-flips affecting phys-
ical qubits within a single tape is thus detected with
probability ≥1/4.
Step III: A similar strategy can be used to prove that
phase-flips of physical qubits belonging to different tapes
yield either errors that do not affect R-traps (we will deal
with them later on using C-traps), or that are detected
with probability at least 1/4.
Consider a combination of phase-flips affecting logical
qubit i within two neighbouring tapes y and y + 1. The
unitary implemented within the tapes is equal to
Xl
′
4Zl
′
5⊕l
′
3RZ(φ
′
3)X
l′2RX(φ
′
2)Z
l′1RZ(φ
′
1) ·
· Xl4Zl5⊕l3RZ(φ3)Xl2RX(φ2)Zl1RZ(φ1)
(here, φ and l label angles and phase-flips of tape y, while
φ′ and l′ label those of tape y + 1). First, we move by-
products affecting tape y+1 at the beginning of the tape.
The above operator becomes
RZ
(
(−1)l
′
4φ′3
)
RX
(
(−1)l
′
3⊕l
′
5φ′2
)
RZ
(
(−1)l
′
2⊕l
′
4φ′1
)
· Xl′4⊕l′2⊕l4Zl′5⊕l′3⊕l′1⊕l5⊕l3RZ(φ3)Xl2RX(φ2)Zl1RZ(φ1)
Next, we notice (Table 1) that all of the combinations
of phase-flips affecting tape y + 1 generate the same by-
products between the two logical rotations. On the other
Figure 15: Example of undetectable errors for R-traps. More
generally, R-traps can not detect error generated by (i) phase-
flips of physical qubits (i, j) and (i, j+2), wheremod(j, 3) = 0,
and (ii) phase-flips of physical qubits (i, 1) and (i,m). We will
refer to errors in the first (respectively second) class as Type-I
(respectively Type-II) errors. Type-I and Type-II errors do
not affect R-traps, but affect universal quantum computations
in general. For this reason, detecting them is imperative.
hand, we observe that the majority of them generates
a different by-product for the logical Hadamard. As an
example, the error defined by l′2 = 1 and the other l
′
equal to 0 produces an extra Pauli-X if tape y + 1 im-
plements a logical RZ-gate or RX -gate, while produces
an extra Pauli-Y (modulo a global phase) if it imple-
ments a logical H . Regardless of other effects (such as
the flip of some signs), this fact is enough to argue that
these errors are detected with probability at least 1/4.
Indeed, the probability that the by-products generated
within tape y+1 cancel out with those generated within
tape y is automatically bounded by 1/2 (recall that tape
y+1 implements a Hadamard with probability 1/2 and a
rotation with probability 1/2). Hence, with the same ar-
guments as in the single-tape case, we can see that these
errors are detected with probability ≥1/4.
The remaining combinations of phase-flips produce the
same by-products regardless of the particular logical uni-
tary implemented within tape y + 1. As an example,
the error defined by l′1 = 1 and the other l
′ produces a
Pauli-Z both in the case where tape y + 1 implements a
rotation or a Hadamard. These phase-flips are detected
with probability ≥1/4 or are not detectable with R-traps
at all. To see this, we consider these particular configu-
rations one by one:
• l′1 = 1, other l′ equal to 0. This error produces
the honest gate modulo a Pauli-Z. The extra Pauli
can be recovered phase-flipping qubit 3 in tape y.
Thus, error specified by l′1 = 1, l3 = 1, other l and
l′ equal to 0 is undetectable for R-traps. In what
follows, we refer to this particular error as Type-I
(Figure 15).
• l′3, l′4 = 1, other l′ equal to 0. This error flips the
sign of rotations implemented within tape y + 1,
hence is detected with probability 1/4 (equation
5) regardless of the unitary implemented within
tape y. The same happens for the following cases:
l′4, l
′
5 = 1, other l
′ equal to 0; l′1, l
′
4, l
′
5 = 1, other l
′
equal to 0; l′1, l
′
3, l
′
4 = 1, other l
′ equal to 0.
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• l′1, l′3, l′5 = 1, other l′ equal to 0. This error produces
an extra Pauli-Z at the beginning of tape y+1 and
does not flip any sign. However, flip of qubit 5 is
equivalent to flip of qubit 4 of logical qubit i − 1
or i+ 1, hence can be detected with probability at
least 1/4.
Thus, we find the same bound as in step II.
Step IV: We now extend the discussion to combina-
tions of phase-flips affecting two non-neighbouring tapes
within row i.
If Bob deviates on two non-neighbouring tapes y and
y′ > y, we can move by-products affecting tape y′ toward
tape y and use a similar argument as the one used in
step III: the unitaries implemented within tapes between
y and y′ are chosen at random, hence by-products do not
cancel out trivially. Indeed, detailed calculations show
that they are detected with probability larger than 1/4.
The only exception is phase-flipping solely the first and
the last physical qubit within the same row i. In this
case, the overall unitary acting on qubit i throughout
the circuit is known to be a RZ -gate. As a consequence,
this combination of phase-flips produces two Pauli-Z er-
rors that cancel out with each other without affecting the
overall unitary. This error is undetectable with R-traps,
and from now on will be referred to as Type-II (Figure
15).
Finally, the same arguments explained above can be
used to show that also the combinations of phase-flips
affecting more than two tapes are detected with proba-
bility larger than 1/4.
Proof. (Lemma 3) Consider Figure 16, which shows the
pattern for logical CNOTs. As can be seen, (i) Type-
I errors acting on the logical control qubit only (i.e.
l1, l2 = 1, l
′
1, l
′
2 = 0) do not corrupt the logical computa-
tion, (ii) Type-I errors acting on the logical target qubit
only (l1, l2 = 0, l
′
1, l
′
2 = 1) introduce a Pauli-Z error act-
ing on the logical control qubit and (iii) Type-I errors act-
ing on both the control and target qubit (l1, l2, l
′
1, l
′
2 = 1)
introduce a Pauli-Z error acting on the control qubit.
Thus, in general, Type-I errors produce by-products of
Pauli-Z in between the various tapes of the BwS. Simi-
larly, Type-II errors can be seen as by-products of Pauli-
Z that first phase-flip some of the inputs to the logical
circuit, and subsequently the corresponding outputs.
To prove the lemma we proceed as follows:
Step I: We prove that for any combination of
Type-I and Type-II errors, there exists some C-trap
that can detect the error with probability 1 (mean-
ing, by “some C-trap”, a specific configuration of
target and control qubits for every CNOT in the
logical circuit).
Step II: We consider the different combinations of
Type-I and Type-II errors affecting the C-trap and
show that they are detected with probability ≥1/2.
l1 l2
l′1 l
′
2
0 0 pi/2 0 0
0 pi/2 0 pi/2 0
i+ 1
i
y
i+ 1
i
RZ (−
π
2
)Zl1
RX(−
π
2
)Zl
′
1
Zl2
RX(
π
2
)Zl
′
2
Figure 16: Type-I errors affecting the computation at the
physical (top figure) and logical (bottom figure) level. Logical
qubit i is used as control and logical qubit i+1 as the target.
(a) Errors trivially cancel
out.
(b) Errors do not cancel
out.
Figure 17: Proof of equation 8, an example. Red crosses
represent by-products of Pauli-Z. Figure 17a illustrates a
combination of CNOTs such that errors cancel out with each
other. A configuration of CNOTs that does not let errors
cancel out can be found swapping control and target qubits
in every brick (Figure 17b).
To be specific, we first show that this is true
for errors affecting two nearest-neighbouring tapes.
Next, we argue that any combination of Type-I and
Type-II errors can be rewritten as a specific er-
ror affecting two nearest-neighbouring tapes, and
so that the bound holds in general.
In more detail:
Step I. We begin by describing the notation that will
be used along this step of the proof. We formally define
CNOTs acting on qubits c (control) and t (target) as
cXc,t = |0〉c〈0| ⊗ 1t + |1〉c〈1| ⊗Xt (6)
Next, we represent the unitary implemented within tape
y with cXk¯y (notice the bold font used to distinguish n-
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(a) Type-I errors affecting two nearest-neighbouring and
overlapping bricks within nearest-neighbouring tapes.
The phase-flip of red physical qubits is detected with
probability 1/2, while any other combination of Type-I
errors is detected with probability ≥ 1/2.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
y y + 1
(b) Type-I errors affecting four nearest-neighbouring and
overlapping bricks. The phase-flip of red physical qubits
is detected with probability 1/4, while any other combi-
nation of Type-I errors is detected with probability ≥ 1/4.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
y y + 1
(c) Type-I errors affecting three nearest-neighbouring and
overlapping bricks. The phase-flip of red physical qubits
is detected with probability 1/8, while any other combi-
nation of Type-I errors is detected with probability ≥ 1/8.
Figure 18: Type-I errors affecting nearest-neighbouring
tapes. In any picture, we illustrate the error that has the
least probability of being detected. The reader can verify
that any other combination of Type-I errors is detected with
higher probability.
qubit operations from two-qubit ones). Here, k¯ is a bi-
nary vector composed by n/2 elements if y is odd, and
by n/2 − 1 if y is even. As a convention, indicating the
null-vector as 0¯, we define
cX0¯y = cX1,2 ⊗ cX3,4 ⊗ ..⊗ cXn−1,n
for y odd
and
cX0¯y = 11 ⊗ cX2,3 ⊗ cX4,5 ⊗ ..⊗ cXn−2,n−1 ⊗ 1n
for y even
(7)
Flipping a given element of 0¯ to 1 is equivalent, in this no-
tation, to exchange the role of target and control qubits
in the CNOT operation implemented within the corre-
sponding brick. Finally, we represent by-products of
Pauli-Z as Zg¯ (again, notice the bold font), where g¯ is a
n-element binary vector whose ith-element is equal to 0
if no error is affecting logical qubit i, otherwise is equal
to 1.
With this new notation, we can prove that for any n-
element binary vectors g¯ and g¯′ such that they are not
simultaneously equal to 0¯, there exists a k¯ such that
Zg¯
′
cXk¯Zg¯ 6= cXk¯ , (8)
The proof of equation 8 can be obtained using the rela-
tions (
Zc ⊗ 1t
)
cXc,t = cXc,t
(
Zc ⊗ 1t
)
(
1c ⊗ Zt
)
cXc,t = cXc,t
(
Zc ⊗ Zt
)
(
Zc ⊗ Zt
)
cXc,t = cXc,t
(
1c ⊗ Zt
)
(9)
valid for any two qubits c and t. In more detail, take a
specific k¯ such that Zg¯
′
cXk¯Zg¯ = cXk¯. Using equations
9, it follows that Zg¯
′
cXk¯⊕1¯Zg¯ 6= cXk¯⊕1¯ (Figure 17).
Using equation 8, we can finally prove that for any
error produced by a combination of Type-I and Type-II
errors, there exists at least a C-trap that can detect the
error with probability 1. Consider the operator
U k¯w,..,k¯1C = cX
k¯w
w · .. · cXk¯11 , (10)
namely the unitary implemented by a C-trap for given
vectors k¯1, .., k¯w. Also, consider a specific set of by-
products {Zg0 ,Zg1 , ..,Zgw} corrupting the logical com-
putation (here, Zg0 represents the phase-flips due to
Type-II errors; on the contrary, for any y = 1, .., w, Zgy
represents the errors affecting the logical circuit in be-
tween tapes y and y + 1). In the presence of this devia-
tion, UC becomes
U˜ k¯w,..,k¯1,g¯w,..,g¯0C = Z
g¯0⊕g¯wcXk¯ww · .. · Zg¯1cXk¯11 Zg¯0
“Moving” the by-products toward the end of the circuit
(i.e. commuting by-products with the various layers of
CNOTs via Equations 9) we obtain
U˜ k¯w ,..,k¯1,g¯w,..,g¯0C = Z
g¯′cXk¯ww Z
g¯ · .. · cXk¯11 , (11)
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where g¯ depends on the phase-flips affecting the qubits in
the tapes 0, 1, .., w− 1 and g¯′ = g¯0 ⊕ g¯w. (For simplicity,
we suppose that w is odd. If w is even, the following argu-
ments hold, provided that the by-products are rewritten
as errors affecting the computation before and after tape
w − 1). Before applying Equation 8 and showing that
U˜C 6= UC , we need to show that there is no combination
of by-products such that g = 0¯ for every k¯1, k¯2, .., k¯w−1.
To see this, consider the possible different cases:
• gy1 6= 0 for a given y1 ∈ (0, .., w − 1), all other gy
equal to 0¯. Moving errors toward the end of the
circuit, equations 9 guarantee that g 6= 0 for any
choice of k¯1, k¯2, .., k¯w−1.
• gy1 , gy2 6= 0 for some y1, y2 ∈ (0, .., w−1) (y1 < y2),
all other gy equal to 0¯. Here, we use the same idea
as the one in Figure 17: (i) we move errors toward
each other, until they are separated by a single tape
(say tape d) and (ii) we find out (if it exists) a spe-
cific k¯d that let errors cancel out with each other.
The C-traps where the configuration of CNOTs in
tape d is described by k¯d ⊕ 1¯ do not let the errors
cancel out with each other. Thus, “merging” the
two errors and moving them toward the end of the
circuit, we obtain a g that is different from 0¯. No-
tice that, in some sense, this procedure allows to
“merge” two errors into a single one described by
g.
• gy1 , gy2 , gy3 6= 0 for some y1, y2, y3 = 0, .., w − 1
(y1 < y2 < y3), all other gy equal 0¯. In this case,
(i) we move errors affecting tape y1 toward tape
y2, (ii) we merge the two errors as explained above
and (iii) we do the same with the newly generated
error affecting tape y2 and the error affecting tape
y3. This way, we reduce three-tape errors to single-
tape ones.
• We repeat the same procedure as above for devia-
tions affecting more than three tapes.
Thus, we can indeed apply equation 8. We obtain
U˜C 6= UC , meaning that for some of the terms of the
summation, errors do not trivially cancel out. The
particular sequences of {k¯y}wy=0 defining these terms
correspond to logical circuits that are corrupted by
errors and output a state which is orthogonal to the
expected one.
Step II. We first consider the various combinations of
Type-I and Type-II errors affecting a single tape y1 (i.e.
Zg¯y = 1n for all y = 0, .., w except from some specific
y1). In this case, there is a probability ≤ 1/2 that some
by-products are produced (with equality if the the phase-
flips solely affect two physical qubits on the same line,
inequality otherwise). Moving the by-products toward
the end of the circuit and using equations 9, it can thus be
seen that the probability of detecting the error is ≥ 1/2.
Protocol 2.
Hypothesis:
Alice can measure qubits in the set of bases
{|±〉
τ
(k)
i,j
〈±|}, where τ
(k)
i,j ∈ {0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}.
Input:
(i) the number of computations v.
(ii) the set of measurement angles {φi,j} for the target com-
putation.
(iii) the sets of random variables {r
(k)
i,j = 0, 1} and
{r
′(k)
i,j = 0, 1} and the set of random angles {θ
(k)
i,j =
0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4} for any computation k = 1, .., v + 1.
0. Preliminary operation.
Alice randomly chooses vt ∈ (1, 2, . . . , v + 1) and sets
{φ
(vt)
i,j } = {φi,j}.
For k = 1, .., v + 1:
1. Assigning measurement angles.
If k 6= vt, Alice randomly runs Sub-protocol 1.1 or Sub-
protocol 1.2 on input n×m and obtains the set {φ
(k)
i,j }.
2. State preparation.
For i = 1, .., n and for j = 1, .., m, Alice asks Bob
to create eight qubits in the state |+〉
τ
(k)
i,j
, τ
(k)
i,j ∈
{0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}, and to send them to her. Next, she
measures each qubit |+〉
τ
(k)
i,j
it in the basis {|±〉
τ
(k)
i,j
〈±|}.
If measurements output 0, she sends back to Bob the
qubit in the state RZ(θ
(k)
i,j +pi
∑(k)
(i′,j′)∼(i,j) r
′(k)
i,j ) |+〉 and
discards the others. Otherwise, she restarts preparation
of qubit (i, j).
3. Blind Computation.
3.1 Bob entangles the qubits in its memory and cre-
ates a (n×m) BwS.
3.2 For j = 1, .., m and for i = 1, .., n,
- Bob sends Alice the qubit in position
(i, j). Alice measures it with angle δ
(k)
i,j =
(−1)r
′(k)
i,j φ
(k)
i,j + θ
(k)
i,j + r
(k)
i,j pi and obtains out-
come s
(k)
i,j .
- Alice recomputes the measurement outcome
s
(k)
i,j as s
(k)
i,j ⊕r
(k)
i,j . Next, she recomputes mea-
surement angles of yet-to-be-measured qubits
as {(−1)sXφ
(k)
i,j + sZpi}.
4. Verification.
If k 6= vt and last-column measurement outcomes
{s
(k)
i,m}
n
i=1 6= (0, 0, .., 0) , Alice rejects the whole com-
putation.
Output: Outcomes {s
(vt)
i,m } of measurements of last-column
qubits of the target computation.
18
|+〉
θ
′(1)
1,1
|+〉
θ
′(1)
2,1
|+〉
θ
′(k)
i,j
|δ
(1)
1,1〉
|δ
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Figure 19: Circuit diagram of a computation on a BwS in
the case of trusted measurements. Unitary U
(k)
i,j represents
Bob’s deviations before measurement of physical qubit (i, j)
along computation k. Bob’s private register is initialized in
the state |0〉|B|. For simplicity, in the above picture we have
rewritten each angle θ
(k)
i,j + pi
∑
(i′,j′)∼(i,j) r
′(k)
i,j as θ
′(k)
i,j .
Thus, any single-tape error is detected with probability
≥1/2.
The above lower bound remains valid also for errors af-
fecting more tapes. For instance, consider the combina-
tions of Type-I and Type-II errors affecting two nearest-
neighbouring tapes y and y + 1 (i.e. Zg¯y = 1n for all
y = 0, .., w except from some specific y and y+1). If the
phase-flips affect solely two “overlapping” bricks (one be-
longing to tape y and the other to tape y+1), the prob-
ability of detecting the presence of errors is at least 1/2
(Figure 18a). Conversely, the combinations of phase-flips
that affect more than two overlapping bricks are detected
with higher probability (Figures 18b and 18c), and the
same is true for errors affecting bricks that do not over-
lap.
The same strategy can be used to show that the
probability of detecting combinations affecting two non-
nearest-neighbouring tapes is lower bounded by 1/2
(using equations 9, errors can be moved toward each
other and re-written as errors affecting two nearest-
neighbouring tapes), as well as for errors affecting more
than two tapes (errors can be moved into each other
and “merged”, and so re-written as errors affecting two
nearest-neighbouring tapes).
Summarising, we introduced a verification protocol
that makes use of classically efficiently simulable compu-
tations to certify the correctness of a universal quantum
computation. We described our protocol in the language
of cryptographic protocols and subsequently proved that
it is correct, blind and verifiable, provided that a trust as-
sumption is made on state preparation. In what follows,
we describe another verification protocol where the trust
assumption is replaced by another trust assumption, this
time made on the measurement device.
V. VERIFICATION FOR TRUSTED
MEASUREMENTS
Suppose that state preparation can not be trusted,
while it is possible to reliably measure qubits in eight
different bases {|±〉θ〈±|}, θ ∈ {0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4} and sub-
sequently reuse them. We now show that in this case, it is
possible to use measurements to certify the correctness
of state preparation and subsequently verify the quan-
tum computation by means of the scheme described in
the previous section.
The idea behind Protocol 2 is the following. Suppose
that instead of generating a qubit in a state |ψ〉, a noisy
state preparation device generates the state E(|ψ〉〈ψ|),
where E represents a CPTP-map. Regardless of the
particular form of E , after a measurement in the basis
{|ψ〉〈ψ|, |ψ⊥〉〈ψ⊥|} (where 〈ψ|ψ⊥〉 = 0) the state col-
lapses either into |ψ〉 or |ψ⊥〉. Thus, despite the potential
malfunctioning of the state preparation device, the col-
lapse of the state function into one of the eigenvectors
composing the measurement basis guarantees that if the
outcome obtained is the expected one, then the state of
the qubit after the measurement is itself the expected
one. Based on the above idea, we show that Alice can
blindly generate the same input state as in Protocol 1,
and thus use a similar technique.
A. Description of the Protocol
State preparation in Protocol 2 works as follows. For
any qubit (i, j) belonging to any of the graphs (traps
and target), the set of single-qubit states |+〉θ, θ ∈
{0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}, is prepared. Next, each of these eight
states is measured in the same basis as prepared. If all of
the measurements output 0, then the qubits are indeed in
the correct state. A qubit is thus chosen at random and
used for the computation, while the others are discarded.
In this way, one can produce all of the graphs required
by the verification protocol illustrated in the previous
section.
We now provide a more detailed description of our
scheme in the language of cryptographic protocols. The
roles played by Alice and Bob within the interactive game
are described by Protocol 2, that is a protocol for Al-
ice making measurements in the discrete set of bases
{|±〉φ〈±|}, φ ∈ {0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}. As in Protocol 1, Alice
verifies Bob’s behaviours by hiding the target computa-
tion among v traps of the kind explained in the previous
section.
The main difference with Protocol 1 regards the prepa-
ration of the physical qubits belonging to the various
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graphs. Notice that for state preparation Alice needs
a short-time single-qubit memory if qubits are measured
one after the other, or eight different measurements de-
vices if qubits are measured at the same time.
For any computation k = 1, .., v+1, the physical qubits
belonging to the BwS are prepared as follows. For any
physical qubit (i, j), Bob creates eight qubits in the state
|+〉
τ
(k)
i,j
, τ
(k)
i,j ∈ (0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4), and sends them to Al-
ice. Alice measures each qubit |+〉
τ
(k)
i,j
by angle τ
(k)
i,j and
checks the outcomes. If all of the measurements yield
0, she concludes that she holds the correct eight-qubit
state, sends a randomly chosen qubit back to Bob and
discards the remaining ones. On the contrary, if some
measurement yields 1, she concludes that Bob is provid-
ing her with qubits in the wrong state, hence restarts
state preparation of qubit (i, j).
After receiving every physical qubit belonging to the
kth BwS, Bob stores all of them in his register and finally
creates the graph. Computational measurements are per-
formed by Alice, who does not disclose any information
about computational angles nor about measurement out-
comes.
B. Overheads
The amount of qubits sent by Alice to Bob equals
NAqubit = (v + 1)nm, while Bob sends to Alice N
B
qubit =
9(v+1)nm qubits (namely 8(v+1)nm during state prepa-
ration and (v+1)nm during the actual computation). No
bits are exchanged during the protocol. Although the in-
teraction might potentially be done off-line, it is in fact
done on-line. This is because Alice can not store in her
register all of the physical qubits, hence she needs Bob
to use the communication channel several times.
C. Correctness, Blindness and Verifiability
We now illustrate the results regarding Protocol 2.
First, we formally prove that state preparation outputs
the correct state, regardless of Bob’s deviations (Lemma
4). Next, we show that Protocol 2 is correct, blind and
verifiable.
Lemma 4. If Alice accepts, then state preparation
(namely step 2 of Protocol 2) always produces the cor-
rect outcome.
Proof. Consider state preparation of qubit (i, j) along
computation k. Suppose that Bob sends Alice the eight-
qubit state
ρ˜i,j = TrB
[
Ei,j
(
⊗τi,j |+〉τi,j 〈+|
)]
, (12)
where Ei,j represents a CPTP-map and B labels Bob’s
private system. Consider the case where measurements
yield 0 (otherwise the whole procedure is restarted).
In this case, the measurement operation maps ρ˜i,j into⊗7
l=0 |+〉lπ/4〈+|, i.e. the correct eight-qubit state.
Theorem 4. [Correctness] Protocol 2 is correct.
Proof. Correctness can be proven with the same argu-
ments as those used for Protocol 1, even though Alice
makes the measurements instead of Bob. Indeed, the
main difference between the two protocols consists in
state preparation, which is correct by Lemma 4.
Theorem 5. [Blindness] Protocol 2 is blind.
Proof. Blindness is guaranteed by the no-communication
theorem [1]. The no-communication theorem states that
Alice can not send any kind information to Bob by solely
making measurements on her part of the system, even if
her system is entangled with Bob’s one. Thus, Bob can
not retrieve any information about measurement angles.
Theorem 6. [Verifiability] For any v ≥ 7, Protocol 2
is ε-verifiable with soundness
ε =
7
v + 1
(
7
8
)6
∼= 3.14
v + 1
, (13)
where v represents the number of trap computations.
Proof. Completeness can be proven with the same argu-
ments used for Protocol 1, together with correctness of
state preparation (Lemma 4).
To prove soundness, suppose that for any qubit (i, j)
of any computation k ∈ (1, .., v + 1), the measurements
performed during state preparation yield outcome 0. As
a consequence, the qubits sent by Alice to Bob are in
the correct state (Lemma 4) and the computation can be
described by the circuit in Figure 19. It is possible to
simplify the circuit by (i) moving deviations toward the
end of the circuit and merging them into a single unitary
UB, (ii) expressing controlled-RZ gates as uncontrolled
rotations and (iii) simplifying pre-rotations in the states
with θ
(k)
i,j in the angles. This yields the circuit in Figure
7, and the proof of the theorem follows from the proof of
verifiability of Protocol 1.
Notice that the deviations in circuit in Figure 19 do
not affect the measurement angles δ
(k)
i,j . This is due to
the fact that Alice performs all of the measurements and
Bob can not guess any measurement angle. Thus, one
may wonder whether verifiability of Protocol 2 indeed
requires the encryption of the initial BwS by means of
the eight angles θ
(k)
i,j ∈ {0, pi/4, .., 7pi/4}, and not by an-
gles chosen uniformly at random from a smaller set (such
as, for instance, θ
(k)
i,j ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}, which on its own
would be enough to prevent Bob from getting any infor-
mation about the initial state of the BwS). The answer
is yes, and the intuitive reason is the following. Because
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of the presence of controlled rotations, the “overall” de-
viation UB affects measurement angles as well (Figure
7). If measurement angles are not “one-time-padded” by
the angles θ
(k)
i,j , UB carries a dependency on the angles
δ
(k)
i,j . In turn, this does not allow to sum over the ran-
dom parameters r
(k)
i,j and r
′(k)
i,j , which is fundamental to
reduce deviations to a convex combination of Pauli by-
products. Thus, the encryption of the initial state of the
BwS by means of angles θ
(k)
i,j chosen at random from a
eight-element set is crucial to verifiability of Protocol 2.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER STEPS
We illustrated a verification protocol that certifies the
correctness of a quantum computation by means of sev-
eral other classically efficiently simulable computations.
We proved that our technique is valid provided that a
trust assumption is made on state preparation. Next, we
adapted it to the case where measurements are trusted
and qubits can be reused after the measurements. Our
protocols restricts the trust assumptions to operations
on the XY -plane of the Bloch sphere while maintaining
a linear overhead.
An experimentally relevant open question regarding
our trap computation technique is whether it can be
adapted to a scenario where measurements are indeed
trusted, but measured qubits can not be reused. Reusing
already measured qubits is practically impossible in many
experimental implementations of quantum computing
due to practical issues, thus qubits are often re-initialized
into the desired state after the measurement. In this
case, trusting measurements implicitly means trusting
state preparation as well, which defeats the whole pur-
pose of our protocol. Another open question regards the
possibility of making our protocols “device independent”,
namely security in a scenario where state preparation and
measurement devices are both untrusted, but a space-like
separation prevents them from communicating [13]. Fi-
nally, as a future step, we intend to exploit the “symme-
try” characterising our protocols (namely the fact that
state preparation or measurements are performed in the
XY -plane of the BwS, and we make no use of qubits in
the states |0〉 and |1〉, nor of measurements in Pauli-Z
basis) to adapt it to a multi-party scenario, such as [33].
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Appendix A: Correctness of Protocol 1
Here we give a proof of the correctness of Protocol 1. If Bob follows Alice’s instructions, the state of the system
immediately before the measurements is of the form (Figure 6, where the deviations are set to the identity)
σout =
∑
θ,r,r′
cR†(v+1)n,m ..cR
†(1)
1,1 E · (σθ,r,r
′
in )
22nm(v+1)8nm(v+1)
(A1)
In the above expression, we use the notation O · σ = OσO† for an operator O and a state σ. Each operator cR†(k)i,j
represents the rotation acting on qubit (i, j) of computation k and controlled by angle δ
(k)
i,j , E represents the entangling
operation and the summation is made over all the combinations θ = {θ(k)i,j }, r = {r(k)i,j } and r′ = {r′(k)i,j }. For any fixed
θ, r and r′, the state σθ,r,r
′
in is equal to
σθ,r,r
′
in =
⊗
i,j,k
|+〉
θ
′(k)
i,j
〈+| ⊗ |δ(k)i,j 〉〈δ(k)i,j | =
⊗
i,j,k
[
RZ
(
θ
(k)
i,j + pi
(k)∑
(i′,j′)∼(i,j)
r
′(k)
i′,j′
)
· |+〉(k)i,j 〈+|
]
⊗ |δ(k)i,j 〉〈δ(k)i,j | , (A2)
After rewriting the controlled rotations as un-controlled RZ-gates, the classical registers containing the information
about the measurement angles can be traced out. Denoting as ρθ,0,r
′
in the input state obtained by tracing out the
angles (notice that it has no dependency on r), σout can be rewritten as
ρout =
∑
θ,r,r′
[
R†Z(δ
(v+1)
n,m )⊗ ..⊗R†Z(δ(1)1,1)
]
E · (ρθ,0,r′in )
22nm(v+1)8nm(v+1)
=
∑
θ,r,r′
[
Zr
(v+1)
n,m R†Z
(
(−1)r′(v+1)n,m φ(v+1)n,m
)
R†Z(θ
(v+1)
n,m )⊗ ..⊗ Zr
(1)
1,1R†Z
(
(−1)r′(1)1,1 φ(1)1,1
)
R†Z(θ
(1)
1,1)
]
E · (ρθ,0,r′in )
22nm(v+1)8nm(v+1)
Since the rotations in the XY -plane commute with E, we can commute the rotations by angle θ
(k)
i,j with E and cancel
them out. Thus, summing over θ,
ρout =
∑
r,r′
[
Zr
(v+1)
n,m Xr
′(v+1)
n,m R†Z(φ
(v+1)
n,m )X
r′(v+1)n,m ⊗ ..⊗ Zr(1)1,1Xr′(1)1,1 R†Z(φ(1)1,1)Xr
′(1)
1,1
]
E · (ρ0,0,r′in )
22nm(v+1)
, (A3)
where we also rewrote each RZ -gate by angle −φ as XRZ(φ)X . Commuting the Pauli-X on the right-hand side of
the remaining rotations with E, ρout becomes
ρout =
∑
r,r′
[
Zr
(v+1)
n,m Xr
′(v+1)
n,m R†Z(φ
(v+1)
n,m )⊗ ..⊗ Zr
(1)
1,1Xr
′(1)
1,1 R†Z(φ
(1)
1,1)
]
E · (ρ0,0,0in )
22nm(v+1)
(A4)
After the measurement of the first qubit, we obtain
ρ′out =
∑
s
(1)
1,1
[(
(1)
1,1〈+|Zs
(1)
1,1 ⊗ 1
)(∑
r,r′
[
Zr
(v+1)
n,m Xr
′(v+1)
n,m R†Z(φ
(v+1)
n,m )⊗ ..⊗ Zr
(1)
1,1Xr
′(1)
1,1 R†Z(φ
(1)
1,1)
]
E · (ρ0,0,0in )
22nm(v+1)
)(
Zs
(1)
1,1 |+〉(1)1,1 ⊗ 1
)]
⊗ Zs(1)1,1 |+〉〈+|Zs(1)1,1
=
∑
s
(1)
1,1,r
(1)
1,1
[(
(1)
1,1〈+|Zs
(1)
1,1⊕r
(1)
1,1 ⊗ 1
)( ∑
r
(1)
2,1,..
[
Zr
(v+1)
n,m Xr
′(v+1)
n,m R†Z(φ
(v+1)
n,m )⊗ ..⊗R†Z(φ(1)1,1)
]
E · (ρ0,0,0in )
2nm(v+1)
)(
Zs
(1)
1,1⊕r
(1)
1,1 |+〉(1)1,1 ⊗ 1
)]
⊗ Zs(1)1,1 |+〉〈+|Zs(1)1,1 ,
where 1 is the identity on the rest of the system. In the last line we used the fact that Pauli-X operators stabilize
qubits in the |+〉 state to cancel out the residual Pauli-X acting on the measured qubit. When Alice recomputes the
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measurement outcome s
(1)
1,1 as s
(1)
1,1 ⊕ r(1)1,1 (step 3.2 of the Protocol), we obtain
ρ′out =
∑
s
(1)
1,1,r
(1)
1,1
[(
(1)
1,1〈+|Zs
(1)
1,1⊕r
(1)
1,1 ⊗ 1
)( ∑
r
(1)
2,1,..
[
Zr
(v+1)
n,m Xr
′(v+1)
n,m R†Z(φ
(v+1)
n,m )⊗ ..⊗R†Z(φ(1)1,1)
]
E · (ρ0,0,0in )
2nm(v+1)
)(
Zs
(1)
1,1⊕r
(1)
1,1 |+〉(1)1,1 ⊗ 1
)]
⊗ Zs(1)1,1⊕r(1)1,1 |+〉(1)1,1〈+|Zs
(1)
1,1⊕r
(1)
1,1
=
∑
s
(1)
1,1
[(
(1)
1,1〈+|Zs
(1)
1,1 ⊗ 1
)( ∑
r
(1)
2,1,..
[
Zr
(v+1)
n,m Xr
′(v+1)
n,m R†Z(φ
(v+1)
n,m )⊗ ..⊗R†Z(φ(1)1,1)
]
E · (ρ0,0,0in )
2nm(v+1)
)(
Zs
(1)
1,1 |+〉(1)1,1 ⊗ 1
)]
⊗ Zs(1)1,1 |+〉(1)1,1〈+|Zs
(1)
1,1
To obtain the second equality, one needs to define a new variable s
′(1)
1,1 = s
(1)
1,1 + r
(1)
1,1 and make the change of variable
s
(1)
1,1 → s′(1)1,1 (which is possible because s(1)1,1 and r(1)1,1 are independent parameters). Importantly, this change of variable
removes all dependence of the angles φ
(k)
i,j of the other qubits from r
(1)
1,1.
Overall, the state ρ′out represents the state of the system after the first qubit has been measured. As it can be
seen, it does not depend on any of the random variables associated to the first qubit, namely θ
(1)
1,1, r
(1)
1,1 and r
′(1)
1,1 .
Repeating the same calculation as the above one for every other qubits (keeping in mind that the measurement angles
of yet-to-be-measured qubits have to be recomputed as in step 3.2 of the protocol, and namely as {(−1)sX + sZpi}), it
can be shown that the dependency on the remaining random variables vanishes as well. The correctness of Protocol
1 can finally be proven based on the correctness of MBQC.
Appendix B: Blindness of Protocol 1
Here, we give a proof of Theorem 2, which states that Protocol 1 is blind. Blindness of Protocol 1 can be proven
with similar arguments as for other protocols in the prepare-and-send class [7, 31].
After Bob receives all of the physical qubits and the measurement angles, he holds the state
ρB =
1
22(v+1)nm
1
8(v+1)nm
∑
φ,θ,r,r′
pφ
⊗
i,j,k
|+〉
θ
′(k)
i,j
〈+| ⊗ |δ(k)i,j 〉〈δ(k)i,j |
=
1
22(v+1)nm
1
8(v+1)nm
∑
φ,θ,r,r′
pφ
⊗
i,j,k
[
RZ
(
θ
′(k)
i,j
) · |+〉(k)i,j 〈+|
]
⊗ |δ(k)i,j 〉〈δ(k)i,j | , (B1)
where, for simplicity, we have used the notation O · σ to indicate the action OσO† of an operator O on a state σ. In
the above expression, θ
′(k)
i,j is equal to θ
(k)
i,j + pi
∑(k)
(i′,j′)∼(i,j) r
′(k)
i′,j′ , while φ represents the set of computational angles
{φ(k)i,j } for any computation k, θ represents the set of angles {θ(k)i,j } for any computation k, r and r′ represent the sets
of random parameters {r(k)i,j } and {r′(k)i,j } and p(φ) is the probability of the specific set of angles φ representing Bob’s
prior knowledge (if Bob has no has no prior knowledge of Alice’s desired computation, then p(φ) = 1/8nm(v+1) for
any φ). The state ρB can be rewritten as
ρB =
1
22(v+1)nm
1
8(v+1)nm
∑
φ,θ,r,r′
pφ
⊗
i,j,k
[
RZ
(
δ
(k)
i,j − (−1)r
′(k)
i,j φ
(k)
i,j + pir
(k)
i,j + pi
(k)∑
(i′,j′)∼(i,j)
r
′(k)
i′,j′
)
· |+〉(k)i,j 〈+|
]
⊗ |δ(k)i,j 〉〈δ(k)i,j |
Suppose that we act on the above state with the classically controlled unitary CCU , whose action on a state σ and
on an angle δ is defined as
CCU
(
σ ⊗ |δ〉〈δ|)CCU † = RZ(−δ)σR†Z(−δ)⊗ |δ〉〈δ| (B2)
Thus, ρB becomes
ρ′B = CUU · ρB =
1
22(v+1)nm
1
8(v+1)nm
∑
φ,θ,r,r′
pφ
⊗
i,j,k
[
RZ
(
− (−1)r′(k)i,j φ(k)i,j + pir(k)i,j + pi
(k)∑
(i′,j′)∼(i,j)
r
′(k)
i′,j′
)
· |+〉(k)i,j 〈+|
]
⊗ |δ(k)i,j 〉〈δ(k)i,j |
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Summing over all possible θ (which are now only contained in the angles δ
(k)
i,j in the classical register), we obtain
ρ′B =
1
22(v+1)nm
∑
φ,r,r′
pφ
⊗
i,j,k
[
RZ
(
− (−1)r′(k)i,j φ(k)i,j + pir(k)i,j + pi
(k)∑
(i′,j′)∼(i,j)
r
′(k)
i′,j′
)
· |+〉(k)i,j 〈+|
]
⊗ 1⊗3(v+1)nm
where 1⊗t represents the identity on t qubits. Finally, we can sum over the random parameter ri,j . Notice that we
can not sum over all of them at the same time. Intuitively, since Alice recomputes every measurement outcome s
(k)
i,j as
s
(k)
i,j ⊕r(k)i,j and subsequently redefines the set of measurement angles based on the recomputed outcome (step 3.2 of the
protocol), the angles φ
(k)
i,j depend on the parameters r
(k)
i,j of previous qubit. Therefore, we start from the summations
over r
(k)
i,m (i.e. from the r
(k)
i,j of last-column qubits). We obtain
ρ′B =
1
22(v+1)n(m−1)
∑
φ
pφ
⊗
i,j<m,k
∑
r
(k)
i,j
,r
′(k)
i,j
[
RZ
(
− (−1)r′(k)i,j φ(k)i,j + pir(k)i,j + pi
(k)∑
(i′,j′)∼(i,j)
r
′(k)
i′,j′
)
· |+〉(k)i,j 〈+| ⊗ 1m(v+1)
]
⊗ 1⊗3(v+1)nm
Similarly, summing right-to-left (i.e. column per column, from j = m − 1 to j = 1) over the remaining random
parameters , we obtain
ρ′B =
∑
φ
pφ 1
⊗(v+1)nm ⊗ 1⊗3(v+1)nm = 1⊗(v+1)nm ⊗ 1⊗3(v+1)nm
The above state is completely mixed. It is equivalent to the one in Bob’s register up to the unitary CUU . Thus, Bob
holds in his register the completely mixed state, and can not retrieve any information about the computational angles
other than he originally had before the protocol.
